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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.emospa.2017.07.0Laughing out loud at a funeral. Feeling depressed when you are
elected ‘employee of the year’. Empathizing with police during a
protest. Displaying anger when others tell jokes. Feelings which
do not conform to expectations can be problematic in a number
of ways. To onlookers, they can be shocking, irritating or awkward,
while the one enacting such feelings can feel embarrassed or
excluded. If everyone but you is laughing, you aredfor at least
that momentdnot part of the group.1 Such an experience might
be gratifying, intended as open resistance to the prevalent norm
or to common sense. Perhaps you did not want to applaud the
joke. Purposefully rejecting the ways others display or enact a
feeling might even endow you with a sense of dignity or pride. If
shared feelings are viewed as forming and maintaining social ties
e an issue addressed especially in approaches to the emotions
that emphasize cultural patterns e, then not having them can
outwardly signal both social exclusion and the contestation of
norms. But even those feelings we have ‘privately’ can be experi-
enced in this way, as we carry with us an awareness of how we
are ‘supposed’ to feel. The fact that we often feel differently than ex-
pected thus calls for an inquiry into thewider social and spatial pro-
cesses that support prevalent norms and their contestations. Who
can afford to be happy in a particular setting or to show that they
are not? Which social and spatial configurations foster conforming
or dissident feelings?
These questions lead to a second set of issues which arises when
feelings counter expectations. You're entering a bar, where
everyone seems to be cheerful. But maybe the atmosphere
embraced by others as joyful makes you melancholic. And maybe
your melancholia ensues from your particular memories evoked
by this specific place or what makes up this atmospheredsay, the
celebration of a friend's new baby when you have just had amiscar-
riage, or a sense that this is the kind of place where ‘white folks’
bond, and you will never be fully included. Feeling differently as
a response to atmospheric spaces is not only related to norms but
also indicative of processes of subjectification and their social con-
ditions, as writings emanating from psychoanalysis and cultural an-
thropology as well as both feminist engagements with emotions
and recent discussions of affect have highlighted. Affects and emo-
tions subjectify us, and they do so in concert with social and spatial
conditions: they ‘put you in your place’. Conversely, such felt di-
mensions of subjectification can also be regarded as co-
constitutive of the very conditions at play: maybe it is their joy
that makes you depressed. This also signals the complexity of felt
difference, which can modulate with a change of context that is41) uses the term ‘inappro-
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07not always easy to perceive.
This opens up a third line of investigation, where feeling differ-
ently is viewed in the context of the continuous variation of affects.
From such a perspective, feeling is always, at least to a certain
extent, feeling differently. Think of a worker in the service indus-
tries who is awarded a prize for her contribution to the company's
achievements and is proud of it. Yet, perhaps this feeling of pride
does not quite strengthen her sense of belonging to the corpora-
tion, but, rather paradoxically, aggravates a feeling of alienation.
In addition to the fluidity and thus built-in ambiguity of feelings,
this perspective brings into focus the singularity of affects as they
result from complex worldly encounters. “[T]here are necessarily
as many kinds of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, etc., as there are kinds
of objects whereby we are affected”, reasons Baruch Spinoza (1996:
Part 3, Prop. 56, 170). Each feeling, in this understanding, varies
with the kind of object it springs from in the moment of an
encounter in a specific spatial setting. Perhaps it is this funeral, in
this room, with the memories evoked by a certain arrangement of
flowers and with its particular constellation of ritualised mourning,
evocation of existential loss and a relative's melodramatic perfor-
mance which makes you laugh. To the extent that each object-
encounter differs from others, all attempts at normalisation of
feeling can be seen as traversed by an ongoing, irreducible differing
of feeling, the feeling differently which subsists within all feeling.
These scenarios illustrate the variety of angles from which
‘feeling differently’ can be approached. In doing so, they also high-
light that engaging different aspects of feeling differently entails
distinctive frames and conceptsewith particular analytical and po-
litical consequences. Do we focus on the power of norms and
feeling rules or on the forces of subversion and excess? Is our
unit of analysis a culture or a body, a subject or an event? And do
we as researchers relate to the phenomena studied as impartial ob-
servers or as politically (and affectively) invested actors? Feeling
differently seems to be a particularly potent theme for exploring
the tensions among different approaches to such issues e as well
as their multiple interconnecting threads. In particular, this theme
invites reconsideration of some of the basic assumptions that have
undergirded conceptual debates, and kept them apart.
For instance, conceptual debates around feelings, affects and the
emotions have revolved to a large extent around the question of
whether feelings reproduce social orders or disturb them. On one
end of the spectrum are rules-based and practice-oriented ap-
proaches, which highlight the extent to which emotional experi-
ences and expressions are informed by a shared grammar of
emotion words and patterns that pervades specific cultural con-
texts. On the other end, psychoanalytical and affect-theoretical ap-
proaches emphasize the variability and inherently indeterminate: Approaches and their politics, Emotion, Space and Society (2017),
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bring these divergent perspectives into conversation with each
other. Their respective proponents have frequently avoided
engaging the others, except to criticise and delegitimise them.2
The main thrust of this themed issue aims at exploring the
middling grounds and intersections between such heterogeneous
approaches, without seeking to gloss over conceptual, analytic
and political tensions. In particular, the articles, and this introduc-
tory essay, seek to bring out the importance of social and cultural
norms without reducing emotional life to their mere reproduction
e and without either neglecting or overemphasising the autonomy
of affect and its potential for disruption. The themed issue thereby
picks up recent debates that have begun to move more strongly
across research traditions e also bringing into relief their unique
strengths (e.g. Anderson, 2014; Bondi, 2014; Gould, 2009;
Grossberg, 2010). The focus on feeling differently running through
the contributions advances such engagement by inviting nuanced
investigations of the relations between the norms structuring feel-
ings and the subversion of such norms, considering also affective
dynamics that exceed the play between norms and subversion.
On the one hand, in relation to rules-based approaches, this focus
challenges culturalist assumptions about the pervasive power of
emotional conventions, as it brings to light precisely those cases
where emotions do not fit. On the other hand, however, engaging
ways of feeling differently also contests strong claims around the
singular and excessive nature of affective phenomena, which
upon closer inspection rarely turn out to be independent from
the learned and scripted patterns against which they emerge as
variations or deviations.
Thus moving across heterogeneous approaches also entails
reconsidering the very terminology used to talk about feelings,
emotions and affects. While some authors have advocated clear-
cut distinctions between these terms, attributing them to different
(physiological, personal, social) registers (e.g. Shouse, 2005), others
have favoured more fluid understandings. Especially the notion of
‘feelings’ e which as an analytic concept bears less discursive
baggage than ‘emotion’ and ‘affect’ e has been invoked in ap-
proaches that evade, or explicitly interrogate, binary conceptions
(e.g. Sedgwick, 2003). With its “double meaning, tactile plus
emotional” (Sedgwick, 2003: 17), signifying touch while also
invoking ‘feeling rules’ (Hochschild, 1979), it enables multiple
points of entry for the discussion. This is why we have chosen to
favour ‘feelings’ as a heuristic term here.
However, combining heterogeneous approaches should not be
seen as an end in itself. We also need to ask: which are the partic-
ular epistemological and political projects animating different
routes into the study of feeling? Which kinds of differences do
these strands engage, how do they frame them, and what might
be their effects? To tackle these questions we will first outline
how prominent approaches to feelings have engaged feeling other-
wise. Introducing the contributions to this issue, we will then
consider how the optic of ‘feeling differently’ serves to re-
assemble this broader study of feelings. As we will discuss towards
the end, this also enables a fresh perspective on the political rami-
fications different approaches to researching feelings havedalso
beyond the academy.
1. Approaches to feelings and their takes on feeling
differently
The three lines of enquiry sketched out in the opening2 See for instance the debate between Ruth Leys (2011) and William E. Connolly
(2011) in Critical Inquiry; see also Sharp (2009).
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assertive effects of breaching norms; the complex interplay be-
tween atmospheres and subjectifications; and the continuous vari-
ation and excess of affect. These dimensions of feeling differently
indicate how the topic lends itself to connecting divergent strands
of research initiated by what some have called an emotional or af-
fective turn in a range of humanities and social science disciplines,
including history, sociology, anthropology, cultural geography and
cultural and media studies (see Gregg and Seigworth, 2010;
Lorimer, 2008; Plamper, 2015). While the notion of disregarding
norms or habits picks up on rules-based and practice-theory ap-
proaches, the issue of subjectification invokes especially psychoan-
alytical engagements, as the concept of continuous variation invites
affect-theoretical perspectives. These strands differ greatly due to
their distinctive disciplinary genealogies as well as their wider epis-
temological projects. To begin unpacking how the focus on ‘feeling
differently’ can still foster cross-cutting discussions among them, it
seems useful to review briefly how each of them has framed rela-
tions between norms and difference.
Rules-based approaches focus primarily on the power of
emotional conventions, only at times touching upon their violation.
While within this line of research ‘emotionology’ concentrates on
the display rules a society promulgates for discrete emotions
(Stearns and Stearns, 1985), research on ‘feeling rules’
(Hochschild, 1979), ‘emotional regimes’ (Reddy, 2001) and
‘emotional communities’ (Rosenwein, 2006) strongly criticises the
notion that there are ‘display rules’ for a fixed set of ‘basic emo-
tions’. These approaches do not strictly separate the experience of
feeling from its expression and thus give language a particularly
central role in shaping emotion e even leading to suggestions
that emotions can be considered a kind of discourse (Lutz and
Abu-Lughod, 1990). They therefore emphasise repertoires or even
speak of emotional ‘cultures’ or ‘styles’. With their focus on lan-
guage and meaning, all these variants of rules-based approaches
run the risk of reproducing mind-body dichotomies. This is the
case even where they seek to show how emotional standards
vary across time and space, for example concerning the extent to
which anger was viewed as acceptable (see Althoff, 1998; Briggs,
1970; Hollan, 1988). If these studies engage with difference in feel-
ings, this difference is of a collective naturedthe difference of one
group or society from another, or sometimes also the difference of
one space from another.3 This, however, offers no explanation for
why someone might diverge from the norm within a collectivity
or a particular setting. The predominant assumption has been
that everyone there shares the same emotional grammar.
Similar tendencies can be spotted in approaches based on prac-
tice theory. Characterised by their use of terms such as ‘affective’ or
‘emotional practices’ (Burkitt, 1997; Reckwitz, 2016; Scheer, 2012;
Wetherell, 2012), ‘habitus’ (Holt et al., 2013) or even more specif-
ically ‘emotional habitus’ (Illouz, 2007; Gould, 2009), these ap-
proaches reveal their indebtedness to Pierre Bourdieu's or to
other versions of practice theory. Though they seek to overcome
the mind-body, subject-object dichotomies which have haunted
rules-based approaches, norms and social conventions still remain
central, as emotions are viewed as embodied in habits and routines.
‘Doing emotion’ is seen as part of a continual process of learning or
training as part of a social group and in a particular space. Again, the
notion of shared emotional grammar can make it seem difficult to
explain how a habit can be broken to produce a different feeling.
This problem is mitigated somewhat when this approach draws
more strongly on the performativity framework based in speech-3 On spatially specific emotional styles, see Gammerl (2012); on the distinction
between work and leisure spaces, see Hochschild (1979).
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formances fail.4 This could be considered a form of ‘feeling differ-
ently’ or ‘failing to feel correctly’. Furthermore, it should not be
forgotten that the habitus itself can be a source of resistance to
rapidly changing societal norms, as Bourdieu's notion of the ‘hyster-
esis effect’ suggests, generating feelings that no longer ‘fit’. But
when these analyses focus on the continual reproduction of a spe-
cific habitus through emotions as practices, they can hardly attend
to the emergence of ways of feeling differently and their effects.
Investigations using non-representational approaches to feeling
and affect focus on exactly such emergent, contingent and exces-
sive dimensions (see Anderson and Harrison, 2010; Clough and
Halley, 2007; Gregg and Seigworth, 2010; Massumi, 2002; Thrift,
2007). They seek to shift from engagements with the formative
force of discourses, social and cultural rules or habits to a view on
affect as autonomous movement or intensity ensuing from interac-
tions and encounters between bodies, or among bodies and their
environment (e.g. Bissell, 2015; Wylie, 2005). Whether they draw
on psychologists (e.g. Sylvan Tomkins), neuroscientists (e.g.
Antonio Damasio), the philosophies of Baruch Spinoza as well as
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, or on psychoanalysis, phenome-
nology, feminist and queer theory, these various strands of research
tend to have in common a concernwith virtuality and becoming, in
relation or in contradistinction to what actually is. A focus on
feeling differently thus seems to pervade, and even be constitutive
of, these perspectives. Rather than restricting their empirical anal-
ysis to observable phenomena, affect-theoretical approaches more-
over seek to address emergent capacities and their effects. They
view this openness of affect, its lack of a fixed object ordto use
the phenomenological termdof intentionality, as generative of in-
tensities that may become an engine for progressive politics (see
e.g. Amin and Thrift, 2013; Sedgwick, 2003; Timm Knudsen and
Stage, 2015). In particular feminist, queer and critical race theorists
have highlighted the political potential springing from feelings and
affective relations that rupture or trouble gendered, heteronorma-
tive and racist power formations (e.g. Lim, 2007; Puar, 2007). On
the other hand, affect theorists have also posited social formations
of power as operating themselves through visceral affective regis-
ters (Anderson, 2014), opening up new insights into the technolog-
ical and bodily levels at which power operates, as distinct from the
semiotic levels of the social and cultural.5 Post-operaist theorists
and material feminists connect an engagement with affective en-
counters back to the specific feeling rules implied by different sub-
ject positions in the context of immaterial and gendered labour,
considering the surplus value as well as the suffering this generates
(e.g. Dowling et al., 2007; Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 2010).
Psychoanalytic approaches, finally, have a long tradition of scru-
tinising the vicissitudes of feelings in relation to difference. They
draw on a variety of authors and concepts, from Sigmund Freud's
and Melanie Klein's discussions of positive and negative affect in
relation to subject formation to John Bowlby's and Donald Winni-
cott's accounts of affective attachments and subject-space relations
or Jacques Lacan's ruminations around existential anxiety and
desire. Broadly speaking, psychoanalytic approaches highlight
how unconscious dimensions of feelings go beyond the manifest
content of written sources, images or interview data, but are still4 Cf. Eitler and Scheer (2009) and their discussion of ‘trying emotion’. Reddy
(2001) bases his framework for a history of emotions on speech-act theory and
also discusses the open-ended nature of such performances, putting his framework
on the border between rules-based and practice-theory approaches we outline
here.
5 For critical discussions, see Barnett (2008); Grossberg (2010). For alternative
approaches to the relations of semiotics and affect, see Brinkema (2014) and
Hutta (2015).
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are also of interest to practice- and rules-based approaches. They
bring up various issues regarding feeling differently. In relation to
subjects' feeling in or out of place, for instance, some authors focus
on how “[f]eelings of repulsion and desire, of nervousness, elation
and so on, contribute to distanciation, the avoidance of certain pla-
ces and people, or conversely, attraction to place and to particular
social milieu” (Sibley, 1999: 116). Scrutinizing the affective dimen-
sions of powerful social norms and differences, other authors
discuss traumatic ‘archives of feelings’, powerful affective attach-
ments to optimism or happiness as well as the public circulation
of such feelings (Ahmed, 2010; Berlant, 2011; Cvetkovich, 2003).
Assuming a constitutive mismatch or difference between subjects'
desires and external norms, several authors moreover view feelings
as necessarily involving an ‘abject’ dimension (or Lacan's ‘real’) that
haunts social and symbolic orders from its margins as constitutive
outside (see e.g. Bondi, 2014; Braunmühl, 2012; Pile, 2010;
Stavrakakis, 2010).
As this synopsis indicates, the different routes into an engage-
ment with feeling differently are not entirely separate. Rather, mul-
tiple connecting threads run through them that can be further
explored. Variants of all these approaches, for instance, in one
way or another mobilise performative understandings, reflecting
a broader interest in the ‘doing’ of feeling. References to cognitive
psychology and neuroscience but also to phenomenology with its
specific understanding of the corporeal as collapsing the distinction
between the subject and its surroundings, the inside and the
outside also pervade both affect theory and practice theory, as
well as some rules-based approaches. Psychoanalysis has strong af-
finities with the effects of learning and culturally patterned actions,
just as practice theory does, making it useful for discussing specific
historical constellations. Finally, space-sensitive approaches have
facilitated the cross-cutting of all these research strands (e.g.
Anderson, 2014; Gammerl, 2012; Pile, 2010). A persistent challenge
in articulating these approaches resides in the distinctive ways in
which levels of meaning, semiotics and culture on the one hand
and viscerality and physiology on the other hand are brought into
play. As binary oppositions are becoming increasingly tired, howev-
er, endeavours to generate more nuanced understandings of their
mutual relations are also proliferating (see Hutta, 2015). If a focus
on ‘feeling differently’ thus assists in bringing out differences and
connections among approaches, it can moreover inspire investiga-
tions that work within and across them, as we will now outline.
2. Ways of feeling differently
To stimulate discussions that traverse existent approaches to
emotions, affects and feelings, we are suggesting a focus on ‘feeling
differently’, in the adverbial form.Whereas ‘feeling different’would
place the emphasis on someone's experience of alterity in relation
to a prevalent state, the adverbial form sets a focus on varying
modes or ways of feeling. We thus seek to spotlight emotional or
affective processes, acts and events which both trouble and pro-
duce norms and subjectifications. This calls for appreciating
open-ended affective or emotional processes and practices without
neglecting the habituated and sedimented patterns, structures or
regimes that such ways of feeling differently might emerge from,
relate to or give rise to. Traversing the approaches just outli-
neddand signalling possibilities for new forms of exchange
amongst themdwe can identify at least three different ways of
linking feeling and difference: research can examine, first, how
feelings undermine established differences, second, how they
themselves constitute difference, and, third, how feelings mark,
intensify or naturalise differences. Engaging the particular ques-
tions that arise from these three perspectives on varying ways of: Approaches and their politics, Emotion, Space and Society (2017),
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tween rules-based, practice-theory, non-representational and psy-
choanalytical approaches, and instead invites nuanced
engagements with the ongoing constitution of norms and
differences.
A first line of investigation focusses on how feelings undermine
established differences, time and again breaking through the seem-
ingly unshakable grid of social positions and identifications. From a
rules-based perspective, such an understanding of feelings has
been employed, for instance, to describe how empathy between
the elites and the disenfranchised paved the way for universal hu-
man rights (Hunt, 2008) and humanitarian politics (Fassin, 2005).
Others have discussed how feelings can break through the seem-
ingly insurmountable distance between the present and the past,
an argument proposed in discussions on nostalgia and queer tem-
poralities (Love, 2007; Dinshaw, 2007; Newman, 2012).
Social movements and activisms in particular can support ways
of feeling differently that challenge gendered, racialised and class-
related norms as well as prevalent understandings of what consti-
tutes effective politics (Goodwin et al., 2001; Gould, 2009).
H€aberlen and T€andler (this issue) pick up on this debate by looking
at political activists in 1970sWest Germany who framed capitalism
as implementing specific feeling rules and developed non-
conforming emotional practices as a way to challenge these norms
(see also H€aberlen and Spinney, 2014; Brown and Pickerill, 2009),
whereas Apostoli Cappello's contribution considers how activists
of the Italian squatter movement emphasize emotional difference
in contradistinction to both mainstream society and earlier social
movements (see also Timm Knudsen and Stage, 2012). Such felt dif-
ference, as Ahmed's discussion of ‘queer feelings’ highlights, can
also include “a discomfort which is generative”: “[t]o feel uncom-
fortable is precisely to be affected by that which persists in the
shaping of bodies and lives. Discomfort”, she continues, “is hence
not about assimilation or resistance, but about inhabiting norms
differently” (Ahmed, 2014: 155, emphasis in original).6 This also sig-
nals that felt difference does not necessarily signal a refusal to iden-
tify with norms and the straightforward adopting of an
oppositional stance. Bareither's paper in this issue argues that
gamers who enjoy perpetrating gratuitous violence in the virtual
space of online games are not merely enjoying the transgression
of feeling rules but rather create an emotional space at the intersec-
tion of games and everyday life in which they can enact and expe-
rience humorous incongruities. Emotional dissent can be even
more subtle: for example, Thajib's article in this issue discusses
the ambivalences inherent in being a queer pious Muslim in
Indonesia, showing how feeling narratives ‘fold’ subjects ‘in and
out of emotion norms’.
This leads to a second focus, which enquires more directly into
how feelings constitute difference. Such a perspective has proven
particularly fruitful in research on nationalism, which often draws
on rules-based and practice-oriented approaches (Benei, 2008;
Petersen, 2011) as well as on psychoanalysis (Parkinson, 2015). In
her paper in this issue, Parkinson discusses the ressentiment of a
defeated ‘nation’ being asked to change their feelings. She exam-
ines how Allied post-1945 efforts at ‘re-educating’ the West
German population construed the latter as adhering to totalitarian
modes of feeling that needed to be replaced by a different, more
democratic emotionality. This re-education sentimentale allows for
intriguing questions like whether and how it was possible to tell
and teach somebody to feel differently. From a different angle,6 For a similar understanding of ‘feeling differently’ as oscillating between
equality and difference cf. Nay (2013), a title we discovered only after writing the
first draft of this article.
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minoritarian affiliations through ‘negative feelings’: melancholia,
trauma and suffering can bring out the articulation of political
dissent as well as the formation of minoritarian subjectivities
through expressions of a difference in feeling (e.g. Ahmed, 2010;
Butler, 1997; Cvetkovich, 2003; Love, 2007; Ngai, 2007). Michael-
sen's investigation of an LGBT internet campaign in this issue points
out that negative feelings can also be mobilised by universalising
liberal-capitalist narratives that address potentially everyone's ex-
periences of sufferingdwhile simultaneously eclipsing the partic-
ular suffering of minoritarian subjects. Ultimately, this suffering is
transformed into optimism, which Michaelsen reads as an attempt
to conceal suffering, and hence emotional difference, by referring to
a better future of emotional sameness.
Juxtaposing these divergent lines of engaging with feelings as
constituting difference signals how a focus might be variously
placed on the production of differentialdhegemonic and minori-
tariandsocial identities, or on processes of subjectification and
de-subjectification. However, feelings need not only be viewed as
troubling norms and generating differences, it can also be exam-
ined how they mark, intensify or naturalise existing differences.
Reddy (2001) has for instance investigated the bourgeoisie's
emphasis on their ‘authentic’ feelings as a marker of the difference
established vis-a-vis the nobility's ‘artificiality’. In a similar vein,
Pernau (2014) has analysed the colonial project of separating ‘civi-
lised’ from ‘barbaric’ modes of feeling. Such analyses have proven
particularly insightful where they also consider how various lines
of differentiation intersect and thus unsettle clear-cut assumptions
about who feels in which way (Loos, 2012). Moreover, feelings can
be viewed as intensifying or naturalising existing differences as
these are embodied. This is particularly obvious when sensuously
experienced forms of disgust or aversion express or serve to consol-
idate racist hierarchies (Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 2010; Wise, 2010).
Economic hierarchies and their links to gender and political in-
equalities can also be buttressed by emotional practices, which
has been explored in the domain of care relations, where ‘affective
inequalities’ (Lynch et al., 2009) can be viewed as a kind of feeling
differently that naturalises power relations.
Tracing such intensified differences can also reveal how they are
troubled. Trott in this issue reflects on how emotional labour sup-
ports social stratification, yet also opens pathways for affectively
based organising. He argues that in industries from aviation to
retail, differences between high and lower-end production tend
to correlate with the distinction Hochschild drew between ‘deep-
acted’ emotional labour and ‘surface acting’: for example, barely
disguising emotions like frustration provides customers the feeling
of only paying the bare minimum; but, Trott goes on to argue, by
organising encounters across such differences, it may become
possible to generate more joyful affects that enhance one's power
to act.
As this outline signals, setting a focus on the various, often inter-
secting, ways inwhich feelings trouble norms, constitute difference
andmark, intensify or naturalise differences suggests particular un-
derstandings, not only of feelings, but also of difference. Frequently,
debates about the ‘politics of difference’ have revolved around con-
testations between the positions subjects and places assume and
are ascribed todaround what Stuart Hall (1980), drawing on
Gramsci, has called the ‘war of position’. By and large, these debates
have tended to frame differences in terms of discrete, mutually
exclusive terms ordered in binary opposition (for critical discus-
sions, see Haraway, 1999; Massey et al., 1999). As a correlate, resis-
tance has been posited in dichotomous opposition to domination.
Yet, discussions of difference, division and heterogeneity have
also directed attention to the emergence and ordering of non-
binary differencesddifferences which are ‘something’ in and of: Approaches and their politics, Emotion, Space and Society (2017),
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Braidotti, 2005/2006; Massey, 2005), and plural enough not to be
reducible to a binary (Sedgwick, 1990). Likewise, resistance and so-
cial change have come to be understood not only in terms of direct
opposition or through mere inversion of symbolic or political or-
ders, but through such means as hidden transcripts (Scott, 1990),
polysemic bricolage (Hebdige, 1979), parody (Butler, 1990), or ‘dis-
identificatory’ working on and against ideology from within
(Mu~noz, 1999),dall of which can be viewed as bearing a potential
to reorganise social and cultural structures and premises. From
such perspectives, discrete positions and binary oppositions do
not necessarily need to be regarded as fictitious, but can be viewed
as situated within and emerging from amore complex landscape of
non-binary differences. In such a vein, our focus on ‘feeling differ-
ently’ invites nuanced investigations of the ongoing production of
differences and their contingent effects, as they variously trouble
norms, intensify them or give rise to new ones. Ways of feeling
differently, and feelings more generally, are not per se either
consolidating or subversive, nor do they imply a homogenous
emotional structure or style. They therefore cannot be captured
with a single approach to feelings or difference.
3. The politics of researching feeling differently
If feeling differently can figure in a range of enabling and
disabling processes, inviting a variety of intersecting theoretical ap-
proaches, its analysis prompts a series of questions regarding the
wider political aims and effects linked with particular research
strategies. Representatives of the turn towards affect and emotions
have criticized the academic mainstream for disregarding feelings
and over-emphasizing the rational (Bondi, 2005; Frevert, 2009;
Goodwin et al., 2001). They have often also taken issue with the
focus on the semiotic and the discursive that the cultural turn
and constructionist paradigms entailed, trying to forgemore imme-
diate forms of access to the phenomena they studied (cf.
Mazzarella, 2009; Plamper, 2015; Wetherell, 2012). In certain
ways, the emotional and affective turns were intertwined with
the crisis of the Fordist mode of industrial (re)production framed
around the model of the male breadwinner. As the normatively
gendered realms of the publicdassociated with rationalitydand
privatedassociated with intimacydcame under pressure, the
growth of the service industries simultaneously granted feelings
and their performance renewed significance in relation to labour.
In this context various socio-political endeavoursdfrom feminism
across the ecological movement to various therapeutic approach-
esdset out to struggle against an over-emphasis on the rational
and for an appreciation of the bodily and felt dimensions of subjec-
tivity and relationality (cf. Illouz, 2007).
Research engagements with feelings have thus been associated
with political claims that are related to social transformations and
contestations. Yet, answers to the question of how to analyse
feeling, emotions or affects in politically productive ways have
been far from consistent. While some have called for an under-
standing of the political that cherishes affective and emotional di-
mensions instead of relying exclusively on rational deliberation
and critiques of hegemonic systems of knowledge and power (e.g.
Massumi, 2002; Sedgwick, 2003), others have argued that such
non-representational strategies depoliticise feelings by disentan-
gling them from the sphere where power can be properly contest-
eddespecially the sphere of political deliberation (Barnett, 2008;
see also Sharp, 2009). From this point of view, focusing on affect
as pre-discursive or pre-cultural can even be considered a means
to disguise hierarchies. This applies particularly when an all too
simplified understanding of the ‘material body’ disconnects affect
from historically and culturally specific power formations (see thePlease cite this article in press as: Gammerl, B., et al., Feeling differently
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.emospa.2017.07.007critiques by Ahmed, 2014; Leys, 2011). From this angle, feelings
should therefore primarily be considered in close connection to so-
cial and cultural structures, as phenomena that are potentially as
graspable as any other and that can and need to be processed
within critical discourse.
Yet, coming back to the issue of feeling differently, approaches
assuming feelings to be fully graspable risk obliterating the ways
in which such modes of feeling oscillate ambiguously between
the contestation of emotional norms, the dynamics of subjectifica-
tion and the continuous variation of affect. In particular, engaging
with ‘feeling differently’ invites an interrogation of established
forms of striving for social change and highlights the role of feelings
as at least partly excessive and contingent phenomena. Such a
research endeavour does not necessarily collide with deliberative
strategies. Feminist and queer scholars in particular have indicated
possibilities for navigating the seeming gap between the unfath-
omable dimensions of feeling and a politically engaged analysis
that effectively counters powerful discoursesdfor instance, by
highlighting “the critical intelligence of affect” (Berlant, 2008: 2;
see also Ahmed, 2014; Hemmings, 2012). The Chicago Feel Tank's
slogan “Depressed? It might be political!”dnot coincidentally
reminiscent of the feminist motto about the private being political-
dserves a similar purpose. This attempt to join the disruptive force
of the non-representational with critical perspectives on power has
implications not only at the level of analysis, but also at the level of
academic writing and research practice (e.g. Bondi, 2005). This in-
volves issues such as how feelings can be textually represented
(Dowling, 2012), how researchers can account for the impact of
their own feelings on knowledge production (Aurell, 2015;
Drozdzewski and Dominey-Howes, 2015), how they should relate
with research subjects and which formats they should choose for
publishing and discussing their results.
While such efforts indicate ways out of the alleged opposition
between the affective and the critical, researchers engaging with
‘feeling differently’ are also asked to consider how specific ap-
proaches privilege certain forms and scales of political intervention.
Are affect- and practice-theoretical approaches more prone to
tackle the micropolitics of spontaneity and embodied becoming,
whereas rules-based perspectives are more relevant to macro-
forms of organised politics? This also raises the question of what
kinds of difference or asymmetry research on ‘feeling differently’
addresses and how they can be promoted or contested. To what
extent, for instance, do analyses of emotional habitus consider is-
sues of cultural capital and class distinction, of racism or of hetero-
normativity? Do non-representational approaches also consider
how the semiotic contents and formats of media displays form
part of the affective economies they set out to describe?
In this respect, specific potential resides in attending to the
multifarious micro-landscapes of non-binary differences and affili-
ations that sprawl across the rigid grid of powerful macro-
dichotomies like male/female, white/black and straight/queer
(Massumi, 2002; Sedgwick, 2003), while at the same time not dis-
counting the latter's impact (Haraway, 1999). Attention might be
directed at shifting and intersecting scales rather than at just one.
The point here is not to pit micro-events against macro-
structures, local fuzziness against global order, but rather to trace
the intricate ways in which they conjoin and interact. In the debate
on the emotional navigation of cultural differences, for example,
analyses operating at a large scale tend to focus on stereotyping
and intergroup representations, whereby they often reproduce
the categories and asymmetries they set out to explore. Such
studies mostly argue along the lines of rules-based approaches
and concern themselves with patterned forms of emotional behav-
iours ranging from hate and disgust to empathy and trust (e.g.
Hooghe et al., 2009; McAllister and Irvine, 2002). These: Approaches and their politics, Emotion, Space and Society (2017),
B. Gammerl et al. / Emotion, Space and Society xxx (2017) 1e86perspectives might be productively complemented by research
operating both on even larger scales including colonial power for-
mations, and on a smaller scale that improves our understanding
of how racist hierarchies operate on a visceral level (Mai and
King, 2009; Wise, 2010).
Another valuable supplement are studies that, by zooming in on
the everyday and the sensual, reach across the scales of marketable
pluralism and major dichotomies to the scale of minor, intersecting
and instable differences, exploring the trajectories of convivial,
friendly and joyful forms of becoming (Gilroy, 2004; Wise and
Velayutham, 2009; Zembylas, 2015). At the same time, however,
it is vital for research on ‘feeling differently’ to observe how such
singularities can assemble into larger-scale formations (Saldanha,
2006), how effects trickle down, as it were, from macro-to micro-
levels, and how certain phenomena link and jump from one scale
to another in a discontinuous manner. A current example for such
leaps and short-cuts is the rage circulating in the United States,
Europe and elsewhere between public calls for rigid border controls
and racist attitudes vented in more private settings, between par-
liamentary debates about immigration and media representations
of conflicts between ‘locals’ and ‘migrants’. These multifarious con-
nections enable rage to switch levels and to re-surface in unex-
pected places. In this vein, research on ‘feeling differently’ needs
to keep track of larger-scale distributions of fear and resentment,
affective manifestations of racism at the micro scale as well as
the discontinuous movements between them if it wants to inter-
vene in the ongoing emergence and fixing of specific emotional
constellations.
This endeavour ultimately raises the question of how we posi-
tion ourselves as researchers in relation to the processes and con-
testations we enquire. Non-representational approaches often
highlight the potential of radical excess to subvert the status quo.
Yet studies of purposefully developed non-conforming emotional
practices point out that such radical gestures can sometimes be
adapted to hegemonic procedures. At the same time, rather incon-
spicuous and unagitated modes of feeling differently can occasion-
ally generate creative turmoil. It might also be vital to attend to
negative, seemingly unproductive feelings in order to engage
with trauma and build communities of solidarity and care, as queer
debates on negative affect have shown. Focusing on the emergence
of agentic capacities could ultimately prove more potent than
limiting oneself to the paranoid framework of critical suspicion
when examining the mechanisms of marginalisation (Sedgwick,
2003). Again, there does not seem to be any universally valid way
of politicising excessive or immanent, positive or negative affect.
Instead, the polyvalent nature of feeling differently invites the
continued interrogation of the power effects going along with our
research endeavours. Analyses can move into such a direction by
attending to the subversive as well as the conforming features of
the phenomena they scrutinise, and by considering the effects of
their own representational practices. The same applies to analyses
of feelings directed against the oppressive systems of capitalism or
heteronormativity as potentially simultaneously underpinning and
undermining hegemonic structures. Research on ‘feeling differ-
ently’ can thus complicate all too clear distinctions between coop-
eration and resistance. Moving between or beyond the poles of
rules-based conformity and transgressive subversiondmuch like
Bartelby's formula “I would prefer not to” (Agamben, 1999: 19)d
analyses might enrich their political impact by highlighting the
contingent, yet not arbitrary, effects of their own intervention as
well as those of any other action or encounter.
In reaching well beyond the confines of the political in a more
traditional sense of rational deliberation, the various approaches
we have discussed demonstrate how specific understandings of
feeling and difference equip research on ‘feeling differently’ withPlease cite this article in press as: Gammerl, B., et al., Feeling differently
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.emospa.2017.07.007a whole range of divergent political implications. Yet our aim
here has not been to privilege one approach over another. The dis-
cussion rather sought to show that decisions to employ one
approach or the other or any combination of them lends the anal-
ysis a specific political thrust. Settling on a certain strategy is there-
fore not a mere matter of taste, but one that matters. As Haraway
remarked: “[s]ome differences are playful; some are poles of world
historical systems of domination. ‘Epistemology’ is about knowing
the difference” (Haraway, 1999: 281). Especially in debates empha-
sising the ‘ontological’, this epistemological issue remains vital. We
hope that the following articlesdamong many other thingsdalso
shed new light on how differences come to matter through partic-
ular approaches to the study of feelings.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Beate Binder and the journal editors for
their insightful and detailed comments on earlier drafts.References
Agamben, Giorgio, 1999. Bartelby, or on contingency. In: Agamben, Giorgio, Poten-
tialities (Eds.), Collected Essays in Philosophy, Edited and Translated by Daniel
Heller-Roazen. Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 243e271.
Ahmed, Sara, 2010. The Promise of Happiness. Duke University Press, Durham.
Ahmed, Sara, 2014. The Cultural Politics of Emotion, second ed. Routledge, New
York.
Althoff, Gerd, 1998. Ira regis: prolegomena to a history of Royal anger. In:
Rosenwein, Barbara H. (Ed.), Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in
the Middle Ages. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp. 59e74.
Amin, Ash, Thrift, Nigel, 2013. Arts of the Political: New Openings for the Left. Duke
University Press, Durham.
Anderson, Ben, 2014. Encountering Affect: Capacities, Apparatuses, Conditions. Ash-
gate, Farnham.
Anderson, Ben, Harrison, Paul (Eds.), 2010. Taking-Place: Non-Representational
Theories and Geography. Ashgate, Farnham.
Aurell, Jaume, 2015. Making history by contextualizing oneself: autobiography as
historiographical intervention. Hist. Theory 54 (2), 244e268. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1111/hith.10756.
Barnett, Clive, 2008. Political affects in public space: normative blind-spots in non-
representational ontologies. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 33 (2), 186e200. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2008.00298.x.
Benei, Veronique, 2008. Schooling Passions: Nation, History, and Language in
Contemporary Western India. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Berlant, Lauren, 2008. The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Senti-
mentality in American Culture. Duke University Press, Durham.
Berlant, Lauren, 2011. Cruel Optimism. Duke University Press, Durham.
Bissell, David, 2015. How environments speak: everyday mobilities, impersonal
speech and the geographies of commentary. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 16 (2), 146e164.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2014.958520.
Bondi, Liz, 2005. The place of emotions in research: from partitioning emotion and
reason to the emotional dynamics of research relationships. In: Davidson, Joyce,
Bondi, Liz, Smith, Mick (Eds.), Emotional Geographies. Ashgate, Aldershot,
pp. 231e246.
Bondi, Liz, 2014. Feeling insecure: a personal account in a psychoanalytic voice. Soc.
Cult. Geogr. 15 (3), 332e350. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2013.864783.
Braidotti, Rosi, 2005/2006. Affirming the Affirmative: on Nomadic Affectivity. Rhi-
zomes (11/12). http://www.rhizomes.net/issue11/braidotti.html.
Braunmühl, Caroline, 2012. Theorizing emotions with Judith Butler: within and
beyond the courtroom. Rethink. Hist. 16 (2), 221e240. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/13642529.2012.681192.
Briggs, Jean L., 1970. Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family. Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, MA.
Brinkema, Eugenie, 2014. The Forms of the Affects. Duke University Press, Durham.
Brown, Gavin, Pickerill, Jenny, 2009. Space for emotion in the spaces of activism.
Emotion, Space Soc. 2 (1), 24e35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.emospa.2009.03.004.
Burkitt, Ian, 1997. Social relationships and emotions. Sociology 31 (1), 37e55. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1177/0038038597031001004.
Butler, Judith, 1990. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.
Routledge, New York.
Butler, Judith, 1997. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford Uni-
versity Press, Stanford.
Clough, Patricia Ticineto, Halley, Jean (Eds.), 2007. The Affective Turn: Theorizing
the Social. Duke University Press, Durham.
Connolly, William E., 2011. The complexity of intention. Crit. Inq. 37 (4), 791e798.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/660993.
Cvetkovich, Ann, 2003. An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian: Approaches and their politics, Emotion, Space and Society (2017),
B. Gammerl et al. / Emotion, Space and Society xxx (2017) 1e8 7Public Cultures. Duke University Press, Durham.
Dinshaw, Carolyn, 2007. Temporalities. In: Strohm, Paul (Ed.), Middle English. Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford, pp. 107e123.
Dowling, Emma, 2012. The waitress: on affect, method and (re)presentation. Cult.
Stud. <¼> Crit. Methodol. 12 (2), 109e117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
1532708611435215.
Dowling Emma, Nunes Rodrigo and Trott Ben, (Eds.), Immaterial and affective la-
bour: Explored, Ephemera 7 (1), 2007 http://www.ephemerajournal.org/sites/
default/files/pdfs/7-1ephemera-feb07.pdf.
Drozdzewski, Danielle, Dominey-Howes, Dale, 2015. Research and trauma: under-
standing the impact of traumatic content and places on the researcher. Emo-
tions, Space Soc. 17, 17e21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.emospa.2015.09.001.
Eitler, Pascal, Scheer, Monique, 2009. Emotionengeschichte als K€orpergeschichte:
eine heuristische Perspektive auf religi€ose Konversionen im 19. und 20. Jhd.
Gesch. Ges. 35 (2), 282e313.
Fassin, Didier, 2005. Compassion and repression: the moral economy of immigra-
tion policies in France. Cult. Anthropol. 20 (3), 362e387.
Frevert, Ute, 2009. Was haben Gefühle in der Geschichte zu suchen? Gesch. Ges. 35
(2), 183e208. http://dx.doi.org/10.13109/gege.2009.35.2.183.
Gammerl, Benno, 2012. Emotional styles: concepts and challenges. Rethink. Hist. 16
(2), 161e175. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642529.2012.681189.
Gilroy, Paul, 2004. After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture? Routledge,
Abingdon.
Goodwin, Jeff, Jasper, James M., Polletta, Francesca, 2001. Passionate Politics: Emo-
tions and Social Movements. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Gould, Deborah B., 2009. Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP's Fight against AIDS.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Gregg, Melissa, Seigworth, Gregory J. (Eds.), 2010. The Affect Theory Reader. Duke
University Press, Durham.
Grossberg, Lawrence, 2010. Affect's future: rediscovering the virtual in the actual.
In: Gregg, Melissa, Seigworth, Gregory J. (Eds.), The Affect Theory Reader.
Duke University Press, Durham, pp. 309e338.
Gutierrez-Rodriguez, Encarnacion, 2010. Migration, Domestic Work and Affect: A
Decolonial Approach on Value and the Feminization of Labor. Routledge, New
York.
H€aberlen, Joachim, Spinney, Russell, 2014. Introduction. Contemp. Eur. Hist. 23 (4),
489e503.
Hall, Stuart, 1980. Cultural studies: two paradigms. Media, Cult. Sci. 2 (1), 57e72.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/016344378000200106.
Haraway, Donna J., 1999. A cyborg manifesto. In: During, Simon (Ed.), The Cultural
Studies Reader, second ed. Routledge, London, pp. 271e291.
Hebdige, Dick, 1979. Subculture: The Meaning of Style. Routledge, London.
Hemmings, Clare, 2012. Affective solidarity: feminist reflexivity and political trans-
formation. Fem. Theory 13 (2), 147e161. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/146470
0112442643.
Hochschild, Arlie Russell, 1979. Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure.
Am. J. Sociol. 85 (3), 551e575.
Hollan, Douglas, 1988. Staying ‘cool’ in Toraya: informal strategies for the manage-
ment of anger and hostility in a nonviolent society. Ethos 16 (1), 52e72.
Holt, Louise, Bowlby, Sophie, Lea, Jennifer, 2013. Emotions and the habitus: young
people with socio-emotional differences (re)producing social, emotional and
cultural capital in family and leisure space-times. Emotion, Space Soc. 9,
33e41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.emospa.2013.02.002.
Hooghe, Marc, Reeskens, Tim, Stolle, Dietlind, Trappers, Ann, 2009. Ethnic diversity
and generalized trust in Europe: a cross-national multilevel study. Comp. Polit.
Stud. 42 (2), 198e223. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414008325286.
Hunt, Lynn, 2008. Inventing Human Rights: A History. Norton, New York.
Hutta, J[an] S[imon], 2015. The affective life of semiotics. Geogr. Helvetica 70 (4),
295e309. http://dx.doi.org/10.5194/gh-70-295-2015.
Illouz, Eva, 2007. Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism. Polity Press,
London.
Timm Knudsen, Britta, Stage, Carsten, 2012. Contagious bodies: an investigation of
affective and discursive strategies in contemporary online activism. Emot. Space
Soc. 5 (3), 148e155. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.emospa.2011.08.004.
Timm Knudsen, Britta, Stage, Carsten, 2015. Introduction: affective methodologies.
In: Timm Knudsen, Britta, Stage, Carsten (Eds.), Affective Methodologies: Devel-
oping Cultural Research Strategies for the Study of Affect. Palgrave Macmillan,
New York, pp. 1e22.
Leys, Ruth, 2011. The turn to affect: a critique. Crit. Inq. 37 (3), 434e472. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1086/659353.
Lim, Jason, 2007. Queer critique and the politics of affect. In: Browne, Kath,
Lim, Jason, Brown, Gavin (Eds.), Geographies of Sexualities: Theory, Practices
and Politics. Ashgate, Aldershot, pp. 53e67.
Loos, Tamara, 2012. Besmirched with blood: an emotional history of transnational
romance in colonial Singapore. Rethink. Hist. 16 (2), 199e220. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/13642529.2012.681191.
Lorimer, Hayden, 2008. Cultural geography: non-representational conditions and
concerns. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 32 (4), 551e559. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
0309132507086882.
Love, Heather, 2007. Feeling Backward: Loss and Politics of Queer History. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Lutz, Catherine A., Abu-Lughod, Lila (Eds.), 1990. Language and the Politics of
Emotion. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Lynch, Kathleen, Baker, John, Lyons, Maureen, 2009. Affective Equality: Love, Care
and Injustice. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.Please cite this article in press as: Gammerl, B., et al., Feeling differently
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.emospa.2017.07.007Mai, Nicola, King, Russell, 2009. Love, sexuality and migration: mapping the is-
sue(s). Mobilities 4 (3), 295e307. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
17450100903195318.
Massey, Doreen, 2005. For Space. Sage, London.
Massey, Doreen, Allen, John, Sarre, Phil (Eds.), 1999. Human Geography Today. Pol-
ity, Cambridge.
Massumi, Brian, 2002. Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Duke
University Press, Durham.
Mazzarella, William, 2009. Affect: what is it good for? In: Dube, Saurabh (Ed.), En-
chantments of Modernity: Empire, Nation, Globalization. Routledge, London,
pp. 291e309.
McAllister, Gretchen, Irvine, Jacqueline Jordan, 2002. The role of empathy in teach-
ing culturally diverse students: a qualitative study of teachers' beliefs. J. Teach.
Educ. 53 (5), 433e443. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002248702237397.
Mu~noz, Jose Esteban, 1999. Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance
of Politics. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Nay, Eveline Y., 2013. Feeling Differently: affektive Politiken der Gleichheit in Differ-
enz. In: Grisard, Dominique, J€ager, Ulle, K€onig, Tomke (Eds.), Verschieden Sein:
Nachdenken über Geschlecht und Differenz. Ulrike Helmer Verlag, Sulzbach/
Taunus, pp. 281e294.
Newman, Sally, 2012. The freshman malady’: rethinking the ontology of the ‘crush.
Rethink. Hist. 16 (2), 279e301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642529.
2012.681195.
Ngai, Sianne, 2007. Ugly Feelings. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Parkinson, Anna M., 2015. An Emotional State: The Politics of Emotion in Postwar
West German Culture. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Pernau, Margrit, 2014. Civility and barbarism: emotion as criteria of difference. In:
Frevert, Ute, et al. (Eds.), Emotional Lexicons: Continuity and Change in the Vo-
cabulary of Feeling 1700e2000. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 230e259.
Petersen, Roger D., 2011. Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of
Emotion in Conflict. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Pile, Steve, 2010. Emotions and affect in recent human geography. Trans. Inst. Br.
Geogr. 35 (1), 5e20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2009.00368.x.
Plamper, Jan, 2015. The History of Emotions: An Introduction. Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Puar, Jasbir K., 2007. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. Duke
University Press, Durham.
Reckwitz, Andreas, 2016. Practices and their affects. In: Hui, Allison,
Schatzki, Theodore, Shove, Elisabeth (Eds.), The Nexus of Practices: Connec-
tions, Constellations, Practitioners. Routledge, London, pp. 114e125.
Reddy, William M., 2001. The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of
Emotions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Rosenwein, Barbara H., 2006. Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages.
Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.
Saldanha, Arun, 2006. Reontologising race: the machinic geography of phenotype.
Environ. Planning D: Soc. Space 24 (1), 9e24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/d61j.
Scheer, Monique, 2012. Are emotions a kind of practice (and is that what makes
them have a history)? A Bourdieuian approach to understanding emotion.
Hist. Theory 51 (2), 193e220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2303.
2012.00621.x.
Scott, James C., 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts.
Yale University Press, New Haven.
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky, 1990. Epistemology of the Closet. University of California
Press, Berkeley.
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky, 2003. Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity.
Duke University Press, Durham.
Sharp, Joanne, 2009. Geography and gender: what belongs to feminist geography?
Emotion, power and change. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 33 (1), 74e80. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/0309132508090440.
Shouse, Eric, 2005. Feeling, Emotion, Affect. M/C Journal 8(6), W/o Pages. Available
online at: http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0512/03-shouse.php. checked on
10 April 2017.
Sibley, David, 1999. Creating geographies of difference. In: Massey, Doreen,
Allen, John, Sarre, Phil (Eds.), Human Geography Today. Polity, Cambridge,
pp. 115e128.
Spinoza, Benedict de, 1996. Ethics. Penguin Books. London and New York.
Stavrakakis, Yannis, 2010. Discourse, affect, jouissance: psychoanalysis, political
theory and artistic practices. In: Paper presented at Art & Desire Seminars.
http://www.sanatvearzu.net/pdf/IJZS-Stavrakakis.pdf.
Stearns, Peter N., Stearns, Carol Z., 1985. Emotionology: clarifying the history of
emotions and emotional standards. Am. Hist. Rev. 90 (4), 813e836.
Thrift, Nigel, 2007. Non-representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect. Routledge,
London.
Wetherell, Margaret, 2012. Affect and Emotion: A New Social Science Understand-
ing. Sage, Los Angeles and others.
Wise, Amanda, 2010. Sensuous multiculturalism: emotional landscapes of inter-
ethnic living in Australian suburbia. J. Ethn. Migr. Stud. 36 (6), 917e937.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13691831003643355.
Wise, Amanda, Velayutham, Selvaraj, 2009. Everyday Multiculturalism. Palgrave
Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Wylie, John, 2005. A single days's walking: narrating self and landscape on the
South West Coast Path. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 30 (2), 234e247. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2005.00163.x.
Zembylas, Michalinos, 2015. Rethinking race and racism as technologies of affect:
theorizing the implications for anti-racist politics and practice in education.: Approaches and their politics, Emotion, Space and Society (2017),
B. Gammerl et al. / Emotion, Space and Society xxx (2017) 1e88Race Ethn. Educ. 18 (2), 145e162. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
13613324.2014.946492.Dr. Benno Gammerl
Center for the History of Emotions, Max Planck Institute for Human
Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany
E-mail address: gammerl@mpib-berlin.mpg.de.
Dr. Jan Simon Hutta
Department of Cultural Geography, University of Bayreuth,
Universitaetsstr. 30, 95440 Bayreuth, Germany
E-mail address: Jan.Hutta@uni-bayreuth.de.Please cite this article in press as: Gammerl, B., et al., Feeling differently
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.emospa.2017.07.007Prof. Dr. Monique Scheer*
Ludwig Uhland Institute for Historical and Cultural Anthropology,
University of Tuebingen, Burgsteige 11, Schloss, 72074, Tuebingen,
Germany
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: monique.scheer@uni-tuebingen.de (M. Scheer).
7 November 2016
Available online xxx: Approaches and their politics, Emotion, Space and Society (2017),
